A case is developed against Donald Davidson's thesis that any attempt to give meaning to the idea of conceptual relativism is doomed. Even under Davidson's assumption that untranslatability is a necessary condition of a difference between two schemes, it appears to be possible to conceive a situation in which one language is untranslatable for another, but still accessible for truth testing, which undermines Davidson's main argument. One further argument of Davidson's is countered by the observation that even if we play the game of radical interpretation strictly on Davidson's terms, we may well encounter a situation in which the only rational choice is to allow for partial failures of translation, and thus for a difference between the two conceptual schemes.

To introduce a definition of a game in normal form, we need the following concepts: the set I of players; the (pure) strategy sets S₁ for each agent i ϵ I; the payoff functions pi (s₁, ..., s₁) that assign payoffs for all i ϵ I as determined by a possible strategy combination (s₁, ..., s₁).

В обществе с высоким уровнем социальной субоптимльности перенеcение этocа науки нр "общесто в целом" нереалистично ибо не отражаwем "общественны интерес": зтос науки нетыслим без утверждения эпистемической ратциональности а социально субоптимальные ситуации склонны порожать конфликт между эпистемической и интегрально-практической рациальностями. В нем именно вторая отражаем интереcы "общеста в целом" и поэтому первая, репрезентирующая этoc науки, оказываетcя ущемленной и урезанной.

It seems that some English sentences naturally invite irreducibly multiple application of the method of supervaluations. In this paper, I use the machinery and ideology of Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS) to investigate this phenomenon and trace some of its implications, both on the logical and linguistic sides.