In 'The Making of Australian Property Law', Andrew Buck seeks to place property and law in its uniquely Australian social and political context. Rather than Australian property law being constrained by the 'ghosts' of English feudalism and its consequential doctrines of tenure and estates, Buck asserts that the defining feature of Australian property law since the first half of the nineteenth century has been its egalitarianism.

Have you ever stopped to consider what happens to the blood, biopsy or similar sample you give in a hospital setting, or even in your doctor's surgery? In particular, have you ever stopped to ask: do I still own the sample? Probably, like most people, you would dismiss the question; you gave the sample for a diagnostic test and, your diagnosis is the extent of your interest in the sample's fate per sae. But how would your view change if, on closer examination of the consent form, your doctor had assumed all rights to your sample? Add to this the real possibility of the sample being added to a tissue bank at the hospital where you received treatment. Then assume that a researcher extracts part of your DNA from the sample, only to find that is has a valuable medical application; they earn millions in patent royalties, while you the patient get nothing directly in return. Judicial statements about the sanctity of the body, along with the insistence from most jurists that it may not be classified as property, suggest that the researcher does not own the tissue upon which they build their economic gain, but does this broad statement of principle meet the modern realities of gene science and commerce? While aiming to acknowledge and balance public and private interests, my principal objective with this thesis is to argue for an individual's property rights in their body.

This commissioned report considers the extent to which the creation of new property rights in the environment, such as water rights and biodiversity protection interests, can prejudice other private and public interests. it highlights 'second order' effects upon the Torrens title system, constitutional issues and associated public administration concerns.

Environmental property interests will inevitably be fundamental components of any 'environmental economy', and as such their creation is an important area of policy innovation. A key argument in favour of property approaches to environmental protection and restoration is the expectation that a market/property rights approach can achieve environmental goals efficiently, provide new sources of funds, and allow industry to find cost-effective ways of reducing environmental harms. It is also argued that strongly defined private property rights-based approaches minimise the risk of the potential 'tragedy of the commons'. Exclusive, secure and transferable property rights (as far as practicable) arguably ensure the resource ends up being put to the highest value use. However, the proliferation of environmental market instruments and incentive programmes has the potential to create legal complexities for which our existing property governance system may be insufficiently prepared. We are rapidly approaching a time when this propagation may in itself cause significant governance and economic problems. These include the risk of misallocation and over-payment for conservation and restoration of environments through an excess of entrepreneurial zeal meeting an insufficiency of governance capacity, and undermining of the key features of the Torrens system for tracking legal interests in real property. This paper argues both for the creation of new tradeable fractions of the environment, and the integration of these instruments into a streamlined and simple legal and institutional structure. We believe this is not a matter of trading off between the proliferation of interests and instruments, and complexity. We also believe that there is unfulfilled opportunity for public and philanthropic investment in environmental property resources. The challenge for property law in the twenty first century that we identify is one of facilitating entrepreneurship for the environment by unbundling, whilst at the same time ensuring that this process does not result in excessive transaction costs arising from poor institutional coordination.

This paper argues that the right to view has matured far beyond its origins into a wider thing of scenic amenity. The antiquated limitations of the common law that denied view the status of property should be revisited. This reappraisal is all the more cogent given long standing precedent in the USA, the heightened place of the environment in property rights regimes, and the current turmoil over the 'Crown Pastoral Land Act' (1998) land reform on the South Island. We conclude that it is legitimate for the Crown to set a fee against a runholder with exclusive pasturage rights on Crown land for the use and enjoyment of the scenic amenity right.

The resilience of the traditional early-twentieth century bach in the face of a predominantly hostile regulatory environment symbolises that this humble structure is an enduring social, historic and cultural icon of New Zealand.This article will examine the history of four bach communities, three of which have survived judicial scrutiny in recent years. From these cases, it will analyse the nature of the private right enjoyed by bach holders in publicly owned lands, and observe the convergence of historic, social and cultural factors that have enabled a limited form of private tenure on Crown land.The tenacity of bach tenure exemplifies how uncertain private rights in public lands may prevail, notwithstanding that the interest is a simple, even whimsical, footnote in New Zealand's social history.

In 'Property Law in the South Island High Country - Statutory Not Common Law Leases', we contended that Crown pastoral leases confer exclusive rights of pasturage, but no rights to exclusive possession. This challenged an entrenched orthodoxy in the high country that run-holders enjoy powerful property rights analogous to freehold title, including rights of exclusive occupation.' Our argument is premised on the analysis that pastoral leases are a unique statutory tenure, not a common law lease. Thus the ambit of the tenure must be read within the four corners of the statutory remit, not by implication of the common law. The absence of any explicit grant of exclusive possession in either the Land Act 1948 or the Crown Pastoral Land Act 1998 (CPLA) suggests there is no grant. In this case, absence of evidence is indeed evidence of absence. At best, any right toexclusive possession can only be inferred by staring hard at the space between the lines of statute.

Soil management exists at the intersection between natural systems and human systems. Property rights are an important element in the transactions between man and the land. Soil health relies on property rights regimes that encourage the owner of the property right (individual or communal) to achieve their private goals, in ways that are sustainable. In this entry, the linkages between property, society, and soil health and some myths about property rights are explored.

This article examines the statutory, common law, and traditional foundations of property rights in pastoral leases in order to look at recent changes in government policy regarding the implementationof the South Island high country land reform. Called tenure review, this land reform divides Crown land into two distinct forms of tenure – freehold title and full Crown ownership to be managedfor public conservation. Tenure review began inside the bureaucracy of the Department of Lands (now called Land Information New Zealand, or LINZ). The Crown invited holders of pastoral rights to enter voluntary negotiations to determine which land would transfer into freehold ownership, and which would shift into the public conservation estate. In 1998, Parliament granted statutory authority to the administrative process, and formalised the pre-existing rules.