The core principle of the German Basic Law - the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany since 1949 - is the Rule of Law or the broader concept of the 'Rechtsstaat'. The protection of fundamental rights is one important cornerstone of this principle. As the guardian of the Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court has shaped these rights through interpretation by a large body of case law. Taking note of the growing interest among scholars not only in continental Europe but more so in the Common Law world, an extensive English translation of that jurisprudence is very timely.

Some eight decades ago on 24 June 1932, Thailand embarked on a journey towards democratic transformation when the People's Party, an elite group of civil servants, princes, army officers and young intellectuals, who were well educated in Europe and fully infused with the concept of Western democracy, staged a bloodless coup d'etat, demanding a change of government from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. Determined to avoid any bloodshed, His Majesty King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) agreed to abolish absolute monarchy and the transfer of power to the constitution-based system of government by signing a temporary constitution on 27 June 1932. This constitution marked the arrival of Thailand's modern political constitutionalism - the idea that government can and should be legally limited in its powers. Since then, Thailand has been subject to 18 military coups followed by the promulgation of new and/or revised 18 constitutions and numerous changes of government. The turbulent history of Thailand's constitutionalism suggests that there is a need for major constitutional reform - one where the Constitution is reviewed to ensure adherence to the Rule of Law and democracy.

The German Constitutional Court took up its work in 1951, almost two years after the constitution came into effect. The reason for this was that the Court needed a procedural code and could not operate merely on the provisions contained in the Basic Law, which had come into effect on 23 May 1949. That procedural code, spelling out the requirements and rules for the several procedures available at this court and the rules pertaining to the judges and the organization of the court, came into effect in 1951. The 'BVerfG' is actually more than one court. It consists of 16 judges who are organized in two separate panels ('senates') of eight judges each. The two senates are two separate decision making bodies of the court, each with specific tasks that are allocated to them. The full plenary of 16 judges is responsible mainly for organizing the work of the Court and becomes judicially relevant only when conflicts between the two senates in the treatment of a question of constitutional law arise. Underneath the two senates, the court is organized in chambers of three judges, that deal with the admissibility of constitutional complaints, a specific procedure provided for individuals to bring matters to the Court. The sheer number of constitutional complaints brought to the Court has resulted in the necessity to institute this 'pre-screening' procedure to reduce the number of cases to be decided on the merits to a manageable level.

This chapter aims to use the European Union legal system to demonstrate the way in which legal and social interventions are linked, highlighting the ways in which politics marries the two elements. This is not to suggest that this link is in any way unique to Europe, because most chapters in this book suggest that the concept of social licence does, if nothing else, speak of this link. This chapter shows a complex interaction between European laws that defend the social licence of the individual or the enterprise, and national laws intended to restrict this licence to meet particular needs of the state. It highlights an additional international law dimension to the social licence issue, which is generally discussed as being a dialogue between the nation state and its citizens. The role of supra-national organisations in defending the social licence of the enterprise and the citizen is an interesting modern development. The European instance highlights the potential for this supra-national dimension to come into being, and how this in turn can act as a brake on the ability of the nation state to restrict the commercial freedoms of its citizens. With the growth in international trade laws and other forms of convention that have supra-national effect, this dynamic is likely to be increasingly evident.

On 23 May 2009, the German Constitution, the 'Grundgesetz', turned 60. Not very old compared to Australia's Commonwealth Constitution or even the US-Constitution. It is perhaps an irony of history that old countries have young constitutions and young countries old ones. By any measure, 60 years of 'Grundgesetz' has been and continues to be a success story. From post war reconstruction, through the terror years of the seventies to the reunification of Germany after the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe, the 'Grundgesetz' has weathered all challenges and found deep acceptance in the German populace at large. The constitutional systems of Germany and Australia bear many differences but also some similarities. Fundamental rights and their protection figure prominently in the German 'Grundgesetz' but not so much in the Australian constitutional context. Both countries are federations to name the most prominent similarity.

The anniversary of the 'Grundgesetz' on 23 May 2009 was sufficient cause to assemble in Canberra at the ANU constitutional scholars from both countries to address some core issues from a German and Australian perspective respectively. This book contains the written versions of the presentations in the order in which they were presented.

This study examines how the African Court of Justice and Human Rights can be more effective in human rights protection in Africa. At its core, it scrutinizes the current African human rights regime, its weaknesses and strengths. The study argues that for the African Court of Justice and Human rights to be an effective institution, it must remedy the shortcomings encountered by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights as well as the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights'. This thesis acknowledges that one of the main challenges for the consumers of human rights in Africa has been to find an effective forum in which the rights of the most vulnerable can be vindicated. It is argued that for the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to be an effective institution in Africa, it must position itself alongside African traditional judicial institutions and learn lessons from other well-established regional human rights institutions.