The case of the missing generalizations
This review discusses several kinds of linguistic generalizations that pose a challenge for the constructionist approach to linguistic generalizations advocated by Adele Goldberg. It is difficult to see, for example, how such an account can explain the wide-ranging linguistic phenomena governed by structural properties, such as c-command, or semantic properties, such as downward entailment. We also argue against Goldberg's rejection of formal semantics in favour of an account of meaning based primarily on information structure and discourse function.
In Defence of Nativism
There is considerable evidence for innate knowledge furnished by psychology & linguistics, yet widespread disbelief amongst philosophers in particular that there is any such thing. Empirical and conceptual arguments given in support of this scepticism are considered here and rejected.
Mental categories in natural languages
Is the way we conceive of the mind an artefact of the culture in which we happen to live? A recurrent question in the study of languages and cultures concerns the extent to which language and culture shape thought. No one doubts that important conceptual categories are derived from our native tongue but how deep is the impression language makes on thought? Is the way we classify the various phenomena we experience language-and-culture relative in some strong sense? Consider the following thesis: 'But for the language we speak and the culture in which we live we would not conceive of the world in just the way we do'. This is presumably true. However thus stated it is also a very weak claim. For it amounts to little more than the truism above - that many of our conceptual categories are derived from our specific linguistic-cultural context. To be sure, the thesis becomes more interesting once we discover that certain classifications such as those of colour are not the universals we might have expected them to be.