The case of the missing generalizations
This review discusses several kinds of linguistic generalizations that pose a challenge for the constructionist approach to linguistic generalizations advocated by Adele Goldberg. It is difficult to see, for example, how such an account can explain the wide-ranging linguistic phenomena governed by structural properties, such as c-command, or semantic properties, such as downward entailment. We also argue against Goldberg's rejection of formal semantics in favour of an account of meaning based primarily on information structure and discourse function.
Universal Grammar versus linguistic diversity
The target article by Evans and Levinson (E&L) concludes that there is little, if any, empirical evidence corresponding to 'immutable' principles of Universal Grammar. It would be surprising indeed if Universal Grammar failed to leave its imprint on languages around the globe, but it is a misunderstanding of the theory to limit the search for linguistic universals to counting up construction-types across languages, as E&L do in the target article. Here is an instructive quote from Chomsky (1965:6). "The grammar of a particular language ... is to be supplemented by a universal grammar that ... expresses the deep-seated regularities which, being universal, are omitted from the grammar itself. Therefore it is quite proper for a grammar to discuss only exceptions and irregularities in detail. It is only when supplemented by a universal grammar that the grammar of a language provides a full account of the speaker-hearer's competence." As this quote makes clear, in providing descriptions of particular languages, linguists may concentrate on what makes a language special, and not on what it has in common with other languages. Universal Grammar does not, however, attempt to account for exceptions and irregularities. Therefore, little is gained in arguing against this theory by pointing out that human languages exhibit a lot of individual differences. Any challenge to Universal Grammar requires more than this. So what is Universal Grammar, if it is not a theory of constructions that appear in the final state of particular human languages? It is a theory about the initial state of the human faculty for language. Universal Grammar (UG) circumscribes the kinds of hypotheses that language learners can formulate. To cite a famous example constructed by Chomsky almost 40 years ago, UG maintains that children can hypothesize structure-dependent operations, but not structure-independent operations. To illustrate how structure-dependent principles differ from structure-independent operations, Chomsky offers, as an illustration, how Yes/No questions could be related to their declarative counterparts. In view of E&L's conclusions that there are no immutable linguistic principles, it is worth reviewing the claim that structure-dependence is one such principle.
The Logic Instinct
We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English 'or', Chinese 'huozhe', Japanese 'ka') conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive-'or'. It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use disjunction. Findings from studies of child language acquisition and from cross- linguistic research invite the conclusion that children do not learn to be logical—it comes naturally to them.
Within Reason: Rational Choice and Logic
This book is about Rational Choice Theory (RCT). To be more precise, it is mainly about 'technical parts' of that theory. RCT is a school of thought in contemporary social sciences: sociology, political science, ethics, social psychology, history, theory of international relations, etc. The most characteristic feature of RCT is an assumption that the individuals under investigation enjoy a special sort of rationality that drives them to maximise their utility. This assumption of rationality, jointly with some other assumptions, constitutes, in RCT, the basis for explanations and predictions. RCT borrowed its approach from neo-classical economics.