The Logic Instinct
We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English 'or', Chinese 'huozhe', Japanese 'ka') conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive-'or'. It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use disjunction. Findings from studies of child language acquisition and from cross- linguistic research invite the conclusion that children do not learn to be logical—it comes naturally to them.
Realism
To some, Australian realism and Australian materialism are one and the same. However in contrast to 'Australian materialism', the term 'Australian realism' connotes an attitude as much as a doctrine: a no-nonsense approach to a cluster of tangled philosophical questions issuing in a blend of common-sense realism, scientific realism and materialism. In fact, realism and materialism are not the same. There is no reason why metaphysical realism or its specification as 'common-sense' realism should commit its adherents to scientific realism. Nor is there any reason why realism should assume a materialist form. Still less that a no-nonsense approach to science, metaphysics and mind should inevitably result in commitment to either realism or materialism. That one still encounters the three doctrines confounded is largely the result of a historical contingency: that the powerful intellects and personalities that shaped the small community of Australasian philosophy all happened to be forceful advocates of realism both metaphysical and scientific, and also of materialism.