How firms determine the pay of their executive employees is a vital research area. In the Australian context, mining firms form a large portion of listed companies. These miners tend to have more volatile earnings, operate with less certainty and higher risk in relation to capital investment. We look at a sample of ASX listed miners and non-miners from 2005 to 2013. We note that miners pay their CEOs less (AUD 1 m vs AUD 1.5 m for non-miners) overall. However, we also note that miners tend to use enhanced contingent long-term remuneration arrangements to significantly boost the pay-performance relationship compared to non-miners particularly during the pre-GFC period. Curiously, non-miners tend to have more generous short-term contingent arrangements linking executive pay and performance. The GFC, as an event, has adversely impacted these arrangements, lessening the generosity of pay-performance among miners, while enhancing these arrangements among non-miners. Overall, the results of the study provide support for optimal contracting theory and do not generally support the managerial power approach for both mining and non-mining firms.

On 1 July 2012, Australia commenced operation of its clean energy legislation (CEL) with the introduction of a carbon price of A$23 per tonne. Prior to the commencement of CEL, the government engaged with business stakeholders in a round of structured consultations. This engagement process elicited various responses to the proposed laws from stakeholder firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Accordingly, in this paper we have used environmental management theories to examine the responses of firms and NGOs and identify critical 'pressure points' associated with the new laws. The results from our analysis showed that, during the consultations, stakeholders predominantly used pre-emptive responses and communications to shape and change the CEL. In addition, the critical legislative pressure point for business stakeholders was the capacity to manage carbon pricing liabilities in order to maintain sound ongoing financial and investment performance. The study also showed that the use of highly defensive and aggressive responses were ineffectual and did not materially impact the introduction of the new laws.

Economic openness, both in terms of increased international trade exposure and enhanced inter-firm networking, has been a key element of China's economic emergence since the implementation of market reforms and the "opening-up policy" over 30 years ago. Unfortunately, these changes have also coincided with the increased incidence of bribery and corruption. Both in general, and in the specific context of China, research on the relationship between a firm's tendency toward openness and its propensity to engage in bribery is scarce. This study seeks to fill this gap based on empirical evidence provided by a large sample of Chinese firms. The findings of the study reveal that firms' increased networking and openness tend to occur contemporaneously with greater bribery and corruption. We suggest that this may be due to the misuse of guanxi-based networks that coincide with the presence of firms' open network strategies, heightened by the potential loss of resource and capability heterogeneity (and hence reduced competitive advantages) in the context of openness. We further find that firms paying bribes do so as an attempt to overcome unnecessary bureaucratic processes and ineffective institutional support that might tend to hinder their development.

Recent climate change projections and a push towards a universal agreement on carbon emission reductions suggest that firms will need to respond to future regulatory changes. This paper employs an influencing strategies lens to examine how large-scale firms might respond to future climate change regulations. The study uses a structured qualitative methodology to explore and explicate the strategic responses from 21 international firms to the proposed emissions trading scheme outlined in Australia's Garnaut Climate Change Review. The results of the analysis show that firms can use pre-emptive influencing strategies in attempts to shape and mould regulatory design parameters, secure high levels of transitional economic support, and shift the balance of public policies and expenditure. Complementary defensive strategies may also target policy makers and regulators with some of the potential negative consequences of the new regulations.